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This I get. Dealing with the excessive (arguably unbounded) risk taking that super-high bonuses encourages, and the crises such excessive risk-taking produce, finding a way of reining in the expectation of high bonuses for excessive risk-taking seems like the only way to ensure the recurrence of such a damaging crisis is avoided.

On the other hand there is something very disturbing about the recently announced French approach: curtailing the bonus upside but also punishing traders for any substantial hit suffered by the bank.

This seems to me merely to raise the stakes - a contributor to the adrenalin fueled environment that leads to excessive risk-taking in the first place.

The French, of course, are feeling somewhat bruised by the whole Kerviel affair in January 2008 when national financial champion Societe Generale was hit with a 4.9 billion euros ($7 billion) loss due to what the bank maintains was unauthorised trading by Mr Kerviel. The preferred narrative in France is that the bank's systems and controls (including remuneration culture and policies) were not at fault; this was a simple case of a rogue trader. So punishing the trader when the bet goes the wrong way helps reinforce that narrative.

But surely it is better to address the up front incentive for unbridled risk-taking rather than pull your punches in favor of creating stiff personal consequences for the failure of the bet? Rogue traders already know that if the bet goes wrong they stand to lose their jobs and their lifestyles, but "rogue" traders (ie those produced by the prevalent bonus culture) show again and again that they never imagine they will fail, that the bet will go against them.

It is the size of the potential upside that motivates their actions and that is where serious politicians and regulators should focus their attention.